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In this theoretical paper we explore interrelationships between conceptual and 
procedural understanding of mathematics in the context of individuals and groups. 
We question the enterprise of attempting to assess learnerV¶ PDWKHPDWLFDO
understanding by inviting them to perform a (perhaps unfamiliar) procedure or offer 
an explanation. Would it be appropriate to describe a learner in possession of an 
algorithm for responding satisfactorily to such prompts as displaying conceptual 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ" :H UHODWH WKH GLVFXVVLRQ WR 6HDUOH¶V ³Chinese Room´ thought 
e[SHULPHQW DQG GUDZ RQ +DEHUPDV¶ Theory of Communicative Action to develop 
potential implications for addressing WKH SUREOHP RI LQWHUSUHWLQJ OHDUQHUV¶
mathematical understanding. 
INTRODUCTION 
The quest to help learners develop a deep and meaningful understanding of 
mathematics has become the holy grail for mathematics educators (Llewellyn, 2012), 
SDUWLFXODUO\ VLQFH 6NHPS¶V  VHPLQDO GLYLVLRQ RI XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LQWR
³LQVWUXPHQWDO´DQG³UHODWLRQDO´FDWHJRULHV5HODWLRQDO RUFRQFHSWXDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
is seen as more powerful, authentic and satisfying for the learner, representing true 
mathematical sense-making. But how can we know whether or not a learner has this 
relational understanding in any particular area of mathematics? The short, closed 
questions which dominate traditional paper-based assessments are unlikely to elicit 
WKLV LQIRUPDWLRQ+HZLWW S  FRPPHQWV WKDW ³LW LVSHUIHFWO\ SRVVLEOH IRU D
student to get right answers whilst not knowing about the mathematics within their 
ZRUN´DQGRIIHUVDQH[DPSOHLQZKLFKDOHDUQHUDJHG±13 was finding the areas of 
triangles by multiplying the base by the height and dividing by 2, but admitted that he 
had no idea why he was multiplying or dividing by 2. This same example is used by 
Skemp (1976) to exemplify his distinction between instrumental and relational 
understanding of mathematics. Yet inviting learners to go further and explain their 
PDWKHPDWLFV LV DOVR SUREOHPDWLF $Q LQYLWDWLRQ WR ³H[SODLQ´ DQ DQVZHU PD\ EH
experienced as yet anothHUUHTXHVWIRU³DSHUIRUPDQFH´ WKH³ULJKW´H[SODQDWLRQ that 
will satisfy a teacher or examiner may be memorised or produced algorithmically, 
just like the answer itself. 
We might ask what it means for learners to have relational understanding of 
factorising a quadratic expression, for instance (Foster, 2014). If they can perform the 
procedure fluently (i.e., quickly, accurately, flexibly and confidently) then would we 
be satisfied (Foster, 2013)? We might argue that relational understanding involves 
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adapting what is known to novel, non-straightforward problem-solving situations. Yet 
a robust enough algorithm will dispose of a very wide range of scenarios, including 
unanticipated ones, and a comprehensive enough set of algorithms might successfully 
deal with any situation likely to be encountered in any assessment (MacCormick, 
2012). If the learner¶VSHUIRUPDQFHFRQWLQXHGWREHIDXOWOHVVZRXOGZHZLVKWRSUREH
their thinking further? To some extent mathematical fluency entails withdrawing 
attention from the details of why and how the procedure works so as to speed up the 
process and allow cognitive space for focusing on wider aspects of the problem 
(Hewitt, 1996; Foster, 2013). A mathematician does not want to have to differentiate 
3x
2
 ± 2x + 4 from first principles every time, although they are capable of doing so. 
Perhaps relational understanding involves an ability to deconstruct the procedure if 
required rather than an expectation that this is going on every time it is carried out? 
But deconstructing a procedure could itself be regarded as a procedure, and 
presumably one that can be prepared for ± even memorised, just as proofs can be 
memorised. So is there something more to relational understanding than expert 
procedural fluency, and if so how might this be conceptualised? Is there a difference 
between being able to manipulate syntax and being able to understanding meaning? 
PROCEDURAL AND CONCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
6NHPS¶V  famous distinction between instrumental and relational 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ FKDUDFWHULVHV UHODWLRQDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DV ³NQRZLQJ ERWK ZKDW WR GR
DQG ZK\´ S  ZKHUHDV LQVWUXPHQWDO XQGHUVWDQGLQJ LV PHUHO\ ³UXOHV ZLWKRXW
UHDVRQV´S :KLOHDFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDW³RQHFDQRIWHQJHWWKHULJKWDQVZHUPRUH
TXLFNO\DQGUHOLDEO\E\LQVWUXPHQWDOWKLQNLQJWKDQUHODWLRQDO´SKHQRQHWKHOHVV 
criticises instrumental learning as a proliferation of little rules to remember rather 
than fewer general principles with wider application. More recently, the terms 
procedural and conceptual learning have been widely adopted, and theoretical 
interpretations of these in mathematics education have increasingly highlighted their 
interweaving and iterative relationship (Star, 2005; Baroody, Feil & Johnson, 2007; 
Star, 2007; Kieran, 2013; Star & Stylianides, 2013; Foster, 2014).  
The most commonly-used definitions of procedural and conceptual knowledge 
in the context of mathematics are those due to Hiebert and Lefevre (1986). They see 
conceptual knowledge as knowledge that is rich in relationships, where the 
connections between facts are as important as the facts themselves, whereas 
procedural knowledge is rules for solving mathematical problems. This distinction 
SDUDOOHOV6NHPS¶VFRQFOXVLRQWKDWWKHUHDUHUHDOO\WZRNLQGVRImathematics ± 
instrumental and relational ± dealing with different kinds of knowledge. More 
recently, Star (2005, 2007) distinguishes between types of knowledge (knowledge 
about procedures or knowledge about concepts) and qualities of knowledge 
(superficial or deep), and complains that these are frequently confounded. He 
KLJKOLJKWV WKH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK ³SURFHGXUDO´ LV RIWHQ HTXDWHG ZLWK ³VXSHUILFLDO´, and 
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³FRQFHSWXDO´ZLWK³GHHS´DQGGUDZVDWWHQWLRQWRWKHSRVVLELOLW\RI³GHHSSURFHGXUDO
NQRZOHGJH´ DQG ³VXSHUILFLDO FRQFHSWXDO NQRZOHGJH´ DV YDOLG FDWHJRULHV Kieran 
(2013) goes further in declaring the dichotomy between conceptual understanding 
and procedural skills a fundamentally false one. Other researchers have also explored 
the interplay between procedural and conceptual knowledge (Sfard, 1991), with Gray 
and Tall (1994) integrating processes and concepts into what they term ³SURFHSWV´ 
(Tall, 2013). But there remains the question of what precisely it is that conceptual 
knowledge consists of beyond confident procedural knowledge. 
THE CHINESE ROOM 
6HDUOH¶V  IDPRXV WKRXJKWH[SHULPHQWDERXWD³&KLQHVH5RRP´was an attack 
RQ WKH ³VWURQJ´ DUWLILFLDO LQWHOOLJHQFH FODLP WKDW D FRPSXWHU LV D PLQG KDYLQJ
FRJQLWLYH VWDWHV VXFK DV ³XQGHUVWDQGLQJ´6HDUOH LPDJLQHG D QDWLYH(QJOLVK VSHDNHU
who knew no Chinese locked in a room with a book of instructions for manipulating 
Chinese symbols. Messages in Chinese are posted through the door and the English 
speaker follows the instructions in the book to produce new messages in Chinese, 
which they post out of the room. Unknown to them, they are having a conversation in 
Chinese, a language which they do not speak a word of. Searle argued that syntax 
GRHV QRW DGG XS WR VHPDQWLFV EHKDYLQJ ³DV LI´ \RX XQGHUVWDQG LV QRW WKH VDPH DV
understanding. But it is very difficult to pinpoint exactly where the difference lies 
(Gavalas, 2007) 6HDUOH GRHV DFNQRZOHGJH WKDW ³7KH UXOHV DUH LQ (QJOLVK DQG ,
XQGHUVWDQGWKHVHUXOHVDVZHOODVDQ\RWKHUQDWLYHVSHDNHURI(QJOLVK´1980, p. 418), 
but it remains mysterious exactly what test could distinguish a competently 
performing machine from a real mathematician. A learner performing a mathematical 
procedure may be making mathematical sense to an observing mathematician, such 
as a teacher, without apparently knowing much themselves about what they are 
doing. 
The focus here has now changed from whether the computer (or the mind as a 
computer) understands mathematics to the question of whether some computer could 
be such that it is indistinguishable from a real mathematician. It may be that, whether 
or not you could tell them apart, they would perform the tasks of producing 
syntactically correct mathematics in importantly different manners. Thus the issue 
becomes the sense in which rules are being followed. If rules are followed in a 
meaningful sense and their semantic content is well defined and connected within 
constellations of schemas, then test item responses could be strong evidence of 
mathematical understanding. But this requires that those items are designed so that 
they engage procedural knowledge in a sophisticated manner which takes into 
account all of the aspects of the concept image that is the object of assessment. We 
could specify an additional requirement that the test be administered to a human 
being and not a computer. While this may seem flippant, it points to the heart of 
6HDUOH¶VDUJument, which is that humans follow rules through semantic causality that 
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is more or less part of the ³KDUGZDUH´ of our brains; that there is no (or minimal) 
³software´ layer (Searle, 1984). So does this imply that truly instrumental 
understanding is an impossibility for a human being? 
MATHEMATICAL UNDERSTANDING 
6HDUOH¶VODWHUDUWLFXODWLRQRIVRFLDOWKHRU\DGGUHVVHVKRZODQJXDJHFDQEHXVHG
to create a social reality which is iterative and generative (Searle 1995, 2010). 
Further, Searle articulates an analysis of language that points towards strong 
connections between the structure of language and the structure of intentional states. 
In some ways this leads us back to the idea of the mathematician as performing as 
though merely in command of a complex constellation of algorithms that are 
triggered and brought to bear in a purely syntactical manner. In light of the argument 
put forth by Searle, we should rather say that the mathematician employs an array of 
mathematical understandings which have semantic content. While this seems 
unsatisfyiQJDVWKRXJK6HDUOHLVVD\LQJ³it is semantic when humans do it´, it bears 
VWURQJFRQQHFWLRQVZLWK6LHUSLQVND¶VDUWLFXODWLRQRISURFHGXUDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGLWV
relationship to conceptual understanding. Procedural understandings, according to 
Sierpinska (1994): 
are representations based on some sort of schema of actions, procedures. There must be a 
conceptual component in them ± these procedures serve to manipulate abstract objects, 
symbols, and they are sufficiently general to be applied in a variety of cases. Without the 
conceptual component they would not become procedures. We may only say that the 
conceptual component is stronger or weaker. (p. 51) 
Hence, it is reasonable for a mathematician to see many elements of their 
understanding as arrays of algorithms that allow them to address wide categories of 
mathematical problems. Yet this is fundamentally different from how a digital 
computer would operate in a purely syntactical approach. 
Gordon, Achiman and Melman (1981, p. 2) define rules DV³VWDWHPHQWVRIWKH
ORJLFDOIRUPµ,QW\SH-Y situations one does ... X¶´)RU:LWWJHQVWHLQ), it is not 
possible to choose WRIROORZDUXOH³:KHQ,REH\DUXOH,GRQRWFKRRVH,REH\WKH
rule blindly´ (p. 85, original emphasis). Otherwise it is not a rule. It is in this sense 
that Searle raises a question fundamental to this discussion: Should understanding 
mathematics be understood as sophisticated algorithmic arrays which are akin to 
FRPSOH[ FRPSXWHU SURJUDPV"6HDUOH¶V (1984) critique of this and related ideas has 
several facets, the most pertinent of which is that there is an ambiguity in what is 
meant by rule following and that humans and computers do not follow rules in the 
same sense. In essence, Searle argues that humans follow rules in as much as they 
understand the meaning of the rules (which is thus semantic and about intentional 
states), whereas computers are purely syntactical in their rule following; they can be 
VDLGWR³act in accord with formal procedures´ (ibid. p. 45, original emphasis). 
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Returning to the question of relational versus instrumental understanding, it 
seems that LI ZH IROORZ 6HDUOH¶V DUJXPHQWV we can say that mathematical 
understanding is probably not effective human understanding if it is primarily 
instrumental (in the sense of syntactical rule following). However, it is clear that 
procedural, syntactical and algorithmic practices and concepts form an important part 
of the background to meaningful mathematical understanding. Thus from a 
perspective of assessment we would expect it to be important to assess algorithmic 
fluency while also seeking to assess the strength of the conceptual content associated 
with the procedural performance. 
So in contrast to the kinds of digital computers that Searle and Hiebert and 
Lefevre are talking about, algorithms exist within a semantic framework. Perhaps it is 
as though a digital computer (syntactical machine environment) is being modelled 
using a semantic machine environment (the brain). If so, the potential problem for 
mathematics education relating to instrumental learning in mathematics may be that 
the seeming simplicity of rule following is made vastly more complicated by its need 
to run in a sort of virtual syntactic machine running on essentially semantic hardware. 
On the other hand, the generation of correct syntactical content is a power of certain 
constellations of semantic knowledge (relational knowledge). It seems that the 
teaching of algorithms and procedures is crucial for the development of sophisticated 
mathematical understanding, but also that how they are taught is critical to supporting 
the development in learners of mathematical understanding that goes beyond 
procedural understandings with weak conceptual content (Foster, 2014). 
+DEHUPDV¶ WKHRU\ RI FRPPXQLFation, partly based in and complementary to 
6HDUOH¶VWKHRULHVFDQSRLQWWRZDUGVPRGHOVRIXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGKRZWRDVVHVVLW,Q
communicative action, as defined by Habermas (1984), action is coordinated 
intersubjectively through achieving understanding. The theory of communicative 
action (TCA) analyses communication as having an inherent rationality focused on 
the goal of achieving understanding. Using speech act theory and argumentation 
theory, Habermas identifies categories of validity claims that are raised in any 
communicative interaction and also identifies implicit preconditions for successful 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQ 7KH IRUPHU LV UHIHUUHG WR E\ +DEHUPDV DV µGLVFRXUVH¶ EXW PLJKW
EHWWHU EH WHUPHG µYDOLGLW\-GLVFRXUVH¶ LQ RUGHU WR GLIIHUHQWLDWH LW IURP RWKHU Xses of 
that term in social sciences. The preconditions for communicative action are referred 
WR FROOHFWLYHO\ DV WKH µ,GHDO6SHHFK6LWXDWLRQ¶ E\+DEHUPDV DQG FRQVWLWXWH D VHW RI
counterfactual norms identified abductively as necessary for successful 
communication. These norms are focused on equitable conditions for participation in 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQZKHUHWKHµXQIRUFHGIRUFHRIWKHEHWWHUDUJXPHQW¶KDVWKHRSSRUWXQLW\
to motivate agreement. This is a bit tricky, as Habermas claims that such conditions 
must be assumed by participants as in operation in order to communicate, despite 
representing more of an ideal horizon that never completely obtains. Society is 
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power-laden, and all communication occurs within a social context. Thus the 
breakdown of communication is all too common, and intersubjective understanding is 
seen as a fleeting and fallible goal that is ever approached but seldom attained.  
7KH FODLP WKDW +DEHUPDV¶V 7&$ DQG 6HDUOH¶V VSHHFK DFW WKHRU\ DUH
complementary and can be productively networked is based on the specific 
arguments made by Habermas in the TCA, his use of speech act theory to develop his 
ideas of communicative action and also upon analysis of similarities and departures 
between the principles, methodologies and questions of each author: 
Analytical philosophy, with the theory of meaning at its core, does offer a promising 
point of departure for a theory of communicative action that places understanding in 
language, as the medium for coordinating action at the focal point of interest. (Habermas 
1984, p. 274) 
:KLOH LW PLJKW EH SRVVLEOH WR DUJXH WKDW 6HDUOH¶V WKHRULHV GHSDUW VRPHZKDW
from the kinds of analytic theories that Habermas wants to make use of, this is 
mistaken, since their focus is on incorporating theories of intentionality. Searle beings 
with the structure of linguistic expressions and then deals with intentionality, and 
importantly in his later work he introduces the idea of collective intentionality, which 
is focused on the coordination of speakers, and which is closely related to +DEHUPDV¶
ideas about the importance of intersubjectivity in communicative action: 
For a theory of communicative action only those analytic theories of meaning are 
instructive that start from the structure of linguistic expressions rather than from 
speakerV¶LQWHQWLRQV$QGWKHWKHRU\ZLOOQHHGWRNHHSLQPLQGKRZWKHDFWLRQVRIVHYHUDO
actors are linked to one another by means of the mechanism of reaching understanding. 
(Habermas 1984, p. 275)  
6HDUOH¶V LGHDV DGG ULJRXU DQG GHWDLO DW WKH OHYHO RI VRFLDO RQtology and may 
allow for a more sophisticated operationalising of concepts and constructs based in 
+DEHUPDV¶ 7&$ 7KHVH LGHDV FRXOG EH XVHG WR IXUWKHU QHWZRUN FULWLFDO WKHRU\
cognitive science, neuroscience and other approaches to the study of mathematics 
education so that they may inform one another without reducing one to the other. 
Thus the issue of theoretical incommensurability may be navigated without 
WKHRUHWLFDOLQVLJKWVEHFRPLQJµVLORHG¶ZLWKLQYDULRXVVXE-cultures of theory which do 
not communicate with one another. A common theoretical language might allow 
researchers to disagree with greater clarity without running the risk of becoming an 
over-DUFKLQJ µJUDQG WKHRU\¶0RUH EURDGO\ 6HDUOH¶V LGHDV FRXOG VHUYH DV WRROV IRU
building rigorous analysis of particular instances of theoretical networking, allowing 
productive discussion between theoretical perspectives. 
These ideas can be operationalised to analyse small-group problem solving and 
in this manner interpret the mathematical understanding of participants (Kent, 2013), 
which could serve as the basis for the development of interactive assessment 
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techniques, activities and protocols. Understanding from this perspective is about 
being able to identify what reasons, arguments and evidence could be legitimately 
raised to justify a claim. This emphasis on the identification of shared bases for 
validity can serve as a pragmatic approach to the analysis of human understanding in 
mathematics. Thus when we speak of assessing mathematical understanding we can 
begin to identify as a community of mathematicians and mathematics educators (with 
due consideration of developmental and disciplinary appropriateness) the claims and 
the appropriate reasons that justify these claims. We can consider how to engage 
participants in communicative actions around mathematical goals that require the 
articulation of arguments and justifications that show evidence that the participants 
can explain why certain mathematical claims are true.  
Returning to the Chinese Room, this turn to the social does not suggest that 
there need be two people in the room, but rather that the person in the room must 
share requisite background knowledge or be able to develop it contextually with the 
Chinese speakers outside the room. The idea of communicative competence is key: 
sharing the contextual background knowledge that allows a language to have 
semantic mHDQLQJLVWKHEDVLVIRUµXQGHUVWDQGLQJ¶. This is different from quickly and 
accurately manipulating the symbols in a language in a syntactic fashion: no shared 
understanding entails from such activity. Now it is possible that meaning could be 
attributed to rules or symbols by the person in the Chinese room, but, without the 
ability to test these against another person who has semantic understanding of the 
symbols, no interpersonal communication or shared understanding is achievable. The 
meaning so developed would be a private language that would not necessarily 
correspond to that of the interlocutor. Thus the person in the Chinese room might 
imagine that they were KDYLQJDGLVFXVVLRQDERXWDIDPLO\¶VYDFDWLRQRXWLQJZKHQLQ
fact the interlocutor interpreted the exchange of symbols as being a mathematical 
discourse on the solution to an algebraic problem (or vice versa). 
CONCLUSION 
These ideas about the nature of the relationship between syntax and semantics, 
procedure and concept, and instrumental and relational understanding do not 
undermine the importance of procedural fluency. Pimm (1995) addresses the issue in 
depth and identifies some of the important features of fluency in mathematics 
education:  
For me, fluency is about ease of production and mastery of generation ± it is used also in 
UHODWLRQ WR D FRPSOH[ V\VWHP µ)OXHQW¶ PD\ EH UHODWHG WR HIILFLHQW RU MXVW QR ZDVWHG
effort. It is often about working with the form. Finally, it can be about not having to pay 
conscious attention. (ibid. p. 174, original emphasis) 
Thus fluency, including syntactical fluency, can serve as partial evidence of 
understanding in a communicational context. Mathematical fluency, as in non-
CERME 9, TWG 17, Collected papers, January 2015  
 
105 
 
mathematical communication, is a sign of communicative competence, which is a 
prerequisite for interpersonal understanding according to the 
hermeneutic/communicational tradition (Habermas, 1984; Sierpinska, 1994). Thus 
when we say that a human being does not follow rules in the same sense as a 
computer, we mean that the symbolic rule following (or algorithmic manipulation of 
syntax) is done in the context of mathematical communication, and thus has semantic 
framing. 
+DEHUPDV¶ DUWLFXODWLRn of rational behaviour in discursive practices has been 
identified as productive for the analysis of shared cognition in mathematics education 
(Boero et al., 2010). In communicative action participants achieve shared goals by 
coordinating action (including speech action) through the development of a shared 
understanding. Thus, establishing shared goals and coordinating action around an 
appropriately designed mathematical task could serve as an interpretive basis for the 
researcher (or other virtual participant) to make a judgement about the understanding 
of the participants in collaborative learning of mathematics (Kent, 2013). 
:HVXJJHVWWKDWFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI6HDUOH¶V(1984) critique of cognitive science 
allows for ongoing productive insight into what mathematical thinking is and its 
relation to education. An important problem faced by the mathematics education 
community is how we can use ideas of relational understanding and instrumental 
understanding in a sophisticated manner to promote the learning of mathematics. 
Learners of mathematics should gain genuine experience of real mathematical sense-
making rather than engage in a charade of imitating what they think such behavior 
should look like. The increasing focus on fluency in policy in the UK (DfE, 2013) 
suggests the need for tools and practices to be developed which coordinate ideas of 
cognition, mathematical understanding and educational practices of teaching and 
DVVHVVPHQW 2XU FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI 6HDUOH¶V &KLQHVH 5RRP DUJXPHQW KDV VRXJKW WR
highlight the nuance involved in these issues and the kinds of practices and 
theoretical frameworks that could be leveraged to address the problem of interpreting 
learnerV¶PDWKHPDWLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJ 
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